IS WORKERS' COMPENSATION COVERING UNINSURED MEDICAL COSTS? EVIDENCE FROM T H E "MONDAY EFFECT"
DAVID CARD a n d BRIAN P. McCALL* Steady increases in the cost of medical care, coupled with a rise in the fraction of workers who lack medical insurance, create incentives for workers who are injured off-the-job to file Workers' Compensation claims. Many analysts have interpreted the high rate of Monday injuries-especially hard-to-mcnitor injuries like back strains-as evidence of such claims. T h e analysis in this paper, however, which uses data o n "first reports" of injuries filed with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry between 1985 and , indicates that workers with low probabilities of medical coverage are n o more likely to report a Monday injury than are other workers. l o r e o v e r , employers are n o more likely to challenge the Monday injury claims of workers with low medical coverage rates than the claims filed by workers with high coverage rates.
A ny targeted social program is vulnerable to abuse or even outright fraud in the determination of benefit eligibility. It is widely believed, for example, that a sizable fraction of Disability Insurance recipients are able to work-and are therefore technically ineligible for benefits-but claim a disability ;n order to receive benefits (Parsons 1980; for a dissenting view, see Bound 1989) . Similar concerns are
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expressed about other targeted programs, including Aid to Families with Dependent Children (Wolf and Greenberg 1986) , Unemployment Insurance (Burgess 1992) a n d Workers' Compensation. In the case of Workers' Compensation, rising costs of medical care, coupled with increases in the fraction of workers who lack medical insurance (Olson 1994) , have led to growing concern that the program is paying for offthe-iob illnesses a n d iniuries. Difficulties ., J in policing the boundary between on-thejob and off-the-job injuries have even led some analvsts to DroDose "24-hour" medi- Review, V o l . 49, S o . 4 Uuly 1996) . O by Cornell University. 0019-7939/96/4904 $01.00 health care program and eliminates the special status of work-related injuries (Burton 1992; Baker and Krueger 1994) .
L L that incorporates the workers' Compensation system into a universal

T h e data used i n preparation o f this paper are available f r o m t h e authors subject t o t h e approval o f t h e Minnesota Department o f Labor and Industry. T h e programs used t o analyze t h e data are available f r o m David Card until December 1999.
Industrtal and Labor Relations
Possibly the most striking evidence of fraudulent claim activity in the Workers' Compensation (MJC) program arises from the unusual pattern of Monday accident claims. At least as early as 75 years ago, it was observed that accidents are more likely o n Mondays than o n o t h e r weekdays (Vernon 1921, Chapter 10) . In a seminal paper, Smith (1989) showed that WC claims for strains and sprains are more likely to arise on a Monday than on other days, whereas harder-to-conceal injuries like cuts and lacerations are about equally as likely on a Monday as on other weekdays. Although circumstantial, this evidence is consistent with the view that some workers "post-date" weekend back injuries and strains in order to obtain medical coverage and indemnity benefits through WC.
"
In this paper we present a more direct test of the hypothesis that the "Monday effect" in WC claims arises because of higher rates of fraudulent claims on Mondays than on otherweekdays. Simple models of claimfiling behavior by injured workers and claimmonitoring activity by employers suggest that employees who lack medical insurance coverage for off-the-job injuries will file more fraudulent Monday claims and employers will screen these claims more carefully. MTe test these predictions using administrative data on ' CVC claims from the state of Minnesota. A major limitation of the claims data is the absence of information on medical insurance coverage. Nevertheless, insurance coverage information is available for a representative sample of workers in the March Current Population Survey (CPS) . MTe use a two-sample estimation technique to pool the data sources and study the effect of insurance coverage on the timing of injury claims and the likelihood that employers challenge their liability for a WC claim.
The "Monday Effect" in Injury Rates: Theoretical Issues
To set the stage for our empirical analysis it is useful to consider the implications of a simple theoretical model of injury reporting and claims monitoring that incorporates the possibility of fraudulent claims.' For concreteness, consider injuries like muscle strains and back injuries that are not immediately life-threatening and that typically arise without the occurrence of a verifiable "accident." Employees who incur such injuries off-the-job and who lack full medical insurance coverage have a financial incentive to delay treatment and file a fraudulent MTC claim the next workday. O n the other hand, employers and insurance carriers have an incentive to carefully screen any questionable WC claims. In equilibrium, employees will decide which off-the-job injuries to report as having occurred atwork, conditional on an expected level of claims monitoring, and employers will choose a level of monitoring activity, conditional on an expected rate of fraudulent claims. Now consider the comparison between injury claims filed on a Monday and those filed on another weekday. Assume that the number of on-the-job injuries is constant through the week, whereas the number of off-the-job-injuries occurring prior to work is higher on Mondays.' We would then expect to see a greater number of total accident claims filed on Monday than on other days, a higher employer monitoring rate for Monday claims (manifested, for example, by a higher probability that the employer contests the validity of Monday injuries), and a higher fraction of Monday claims that are ultimately rejected. Of course, these predictions depend on the 'The model is described more formally in Card and McCall (1995) .
2Assuming that the off-the-job injury rate is approximately constant per hour, a typical worker with an 8-to-5 Monday-to-Friday work schedule has a 420% higher probability of an off-the-job injury before the start of work on Monday morning than before the start of work on Tuesday morning. The relative rate of weekend injuries may be even larger if weekend activities (sports, home repair) are more likely to result in an injury than activities during a normal weekday evening. maintained assumption that the on-the-job injury rate is similar o n different workdays. If the true rate of on-the-job injuries is higher o n Monday, then we might expect to see a higher number of WC claims re-" ported on Mondays, but n o higher rate of disputed or rejected claims.
Even if on-the-job accident rates vary across workdays, it is possible to test for the presence of fraudulent claims by comparing the relative fraction of Monday WC claims for workers with different probabilities of off-the-job insurance coverage. In particular, suppose that off-the-job and onthe-job injury rates are similar for all workers, regardless of their medical coverage, and that more off-the-job injuries occur over the weekend than overnight between two regular weekdays. T h e n we would expect the "Monday effect" in injury claims to be larger for uninsured workers than for insured workers. We would also expect employers to expend relatively more resources monitoring the Monday claims of uninsured workers than of insured workers, leading to a higher rate of disputed claims o n Mondays for uninsured workers.
In our empirical analysis we test these predictions b; comparing the relative fractions of Monday injuries among workers with different probabilities of off-the-job medical coverage, a n d the rates at which employers deny liability for Monday injury claims filed by employees with different wrobabilities of medical insurance. O n e potential limitation of these comparisons is the fact that WC covers 100% of medical costs, whereas many off-the-job insurance p r o g r a m s r e q u i r e c o -p a y m e n t s o r deductibles. Thus, even workerswith medical insurance coverage may have some incentive to report their off-the-job injuries as MTC claims. This may weaken the contrast in behavior between insured and uninsured workers.
Initial Data Description
O u r analysis of the Monday effect in Workers' Compensation claims is based o n a 10% random sample of the "first reports" of injury filed with the Minnesota Department of Labor and Industry between 1985 and . A first report is normally posted for any serious injury, and is legally required for all injuries that result in more than three days of lost work t i m e . W u r data set thus excludes minor injuries that only required medical treatment o r u p to three days of lost work time (or both). Some 50,000 first reports were filed annually in the mid-1980s in Minnesota, resulting in a total of 25,563 injuries in our sample.
T h e first column of Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample of claims, including roughly 10% of claims for which n o wage data are available. The other columns of the table show the characteristics of the subsample of injuries with a valid pre-injury wage, classified by the day of the week on which the injury occurred. The level of wages is a key pEedictor of the likelihood of medical coverage. Hence, for most of our analysis we concentrate o n injuries records with valid wage information.
T h e first report forms classify injury claims by type of injury (for example, burn, fracture, or strain), body part (for example, upper back), and cause (for example, struck by falling object). T h e most likely injury is a back strain caused by a slip or fall. Interestingly, back injuries a n d strains, as well as other injuries caused by a slip or fall, are all more prevalent o n Mondays than on other weekdays.
T h e 'average employer a n d employee characteristics in our injury claim sample differ somewhat from the average characteristics of the Minnesota work-force, reflecting the non-random incidence of injuries across workers andjobs. Construction a n d manufacturing jobs, for example, are over-represented in the claims sample relative to their shares of total employment in Minnesota, whereas trade and-services are under-represented. By the same token, SBecause of a waiting period for disability benefits, injuries that result in no more than 3 days of lost work time (including the day of the injury) do not generate an indemnity claim and do not require a first report of injury. female and white-collar workers are substantially under-represented in the sample of M T C claims. The average weekly wage of injured workers ($358) is slightly below the average for all Minnesota workers ($382 per week in March 1987) . Virtually all of this differential is explicable by a small set of demographic, industry, and occupation controls (see below).
Rows 14-17 of Table 1 show the percentage of injury claims with positive indemnity payments (including temporary total and temporary partial benefits paid to workers during their recovery period, permanent partial benefits paid as lump sums or continuing benefits post-recovery, and other lump sum payments), the mean payment conditional on positive payments, the percentage of claims with temporary total benefits, and the mean duration of temporary total disability. The subsample of injuries with a valid wage observation includes a higher fraction of cases with temporary total benefits (71.4% versus 65.9% overall). This differential reflects the fact that the temporary total benefit rate is a direct function of the pre-injury wage: the administrative files are therefore more likely to include the injured worker's wage rate in cases where temporary total benefits were paid.
Mean indemnity payments and the duration of benefits are very similar for injuries that occur on Mondays and other weekd a y~.Weekend injuries, by comparison, have significantly lower mean indemnity payments and significantly shorter benefit periods5 In part, these differences reflect the higher concentration of weekend injuries among retail trade and service workers, a n d the lower average severity of injuries in these industries. Even controlling for industry, however, weekend injuries are more likely to involve female workers, white-collar workers, and lower-wage employees who tend to have lower-cost claims. In view of the distinctive character of weekend workers a n d weekend injuries, we focus exclusively on weekday (that is, Monday-Friday) injuries in the remainder of this paper. Across all types of weekday injuries, 22.95% occur on a Monday. If work hours 5A t-test for a difference in the mean indemnity payment between weekend and Tuesday-Friday injuries has avalue of 3.78. A t-test for a difference in the corresponding durations of temporary total benefits has a value of 2.86.
were evenly distributed across weekdays (see below), one would expect exactly 20% of weekdav iniuries to ar&e on Mondavs. O n , ., this assumption, the "excess fraction" of Monday injuries is 2.95% (with a t-ratio of 10.8) a n d is significantly different from zero at any conventional significance level. By comparison, the fraction of weekday injury claims on Tuesday, Wednesday, a n d Thursday is relatively stable, ranging from 19.0% to 20.1%. The distribution of weekday injury claims is illustrated in Figure 1 for three classes of injuries: all injuries; burns and cuts; and back injuries. As noted by Smith (1989) , the magnitude of the Monday effect ranges by iniury type, with a negligible Monday effect for burns and cuts, and a much larger (5%) excess fraction of back injuries reported on Monday. The pattern in Figure 1 is suggestive: easy-toconceal injuries (like back injuries) are more likely to occur on ond day, whereas highly visible o r immediately threatening injuries (like burns and cuts) are very evenly distributed across the workweek. Although not shown in the figure, claims for workrelated occupational diseases (such as carpal tunnel syndrome) are also significantly more likely to be filed on Mondays than on other weekdays. M7e hypothesize that this pattern is driven by the arbitrary nature of the injury date for an occupational disease and a tendency to begin a spell of lost work time on Monday.
Medical Coverage and the Monday Effect
One simple explanation for the Monday effect in injury rates is that workers postdate their weekend injuries in order to recover their medical costs through the workers' compensation system. A critical check on this interpretation is that Monday injury claims are more likely among workers who lack medical insurance coverage. Unfortunately, our WC claims data set contains n o direct information on the medical insurance status of injured workers. In the absence of this information, we proceed by using a two-sample estimation technique that combines medical insurance coverage data from the March Current Population Survey with data on the timing ofWC injury claims from our administrative data files.6
Consider a sample of weekday injury claims, and let y, = 1 if the ith injury claim is reported on a Monday, and 0 otherwise. Assume that z,, the probability that J , = 1, is a function of a set of characteristics of the worker involved in the injury (xt), and an indicator for whether the individual has off-the-job medical coverage ( m i )
:
If the Monday effect is due to the fraudulent filing ofWC claims for off-the-job injuries, then one would expect y < 0, since uninsured workers have a higher incentive to file a false claim than d o insured work-"wo-sample estimation methods were analyzed by Murphy and Tope1 (1985) , Angrist and Krueger (1992) , and Arellano and Meghir (1988). ers. Actual medical coverage is unobserved in our sample of injury claims. Suppose that a secondary sample is available, however, that includes medical coverage information as well as data on a vector of predictors zt (some ofwhich may be included in xL) that are correlated with medical insurance coverage status. Let
The coefficients of equation (1) can then be estimated consistently by a simple twostep procedure. The first step is to estimate equation (2) on the secondary sample. In the second step, equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least squares, replacing unobserved medical coverage with its imputed value (zt18). This procedure is similar to conventional two-stage least squares, with two important differences: (1) the "first-gender/marital status interaction dummies, 6 occupation dummies, 8 industry dummies, and interactions of the log weekly wage with marital status, industry, and industry-by-gender. This equation is only moderately successful in predicting medical insurance coverage, with an R-squared coefficient of 0.13.8 Although predicted medical coverage is therefore a noisy indicator of true coverage, we believe that the predictions are accurate enough to permit meaningful inferences in the second stage analysis.
A maintained assum~tion in this twosample procedure is that medical coverage status has the same relationship with the predictor variables in the CPS sample as in the WC claims sample. In order to assess the plausibility of this assumption, we used a similar two-stage procedure to first estimate a weekly wage equation for the CPS sample and then predict a wage for each individual in the WC claims file.g As it turns out, the estimated coefficients from the CPS sample provide a surprisingly accurate wage forecast for injured workers. The mean forecast error is less than 0.3%, and the correlation of the predicted and actual wages for individuals in the claims file is 0.59. These findings suggest that the two samples are quite similar (conditional on observable worker and,job characteristics), and that the assumptions needed to justify the two-sample procedure are plausible. show the percentage of all weekday injuries *The estimated coefficients of the prediction equation are reported in Appendix Table 2 of Card and McCall (1995) . The most important predictors of insurance coverage are the marital status/gender interactions and the wage interaction terms. gWe used only age, age-squared, marital status/ gender dummies, occupation dummies, and industry dummies to predict the wage. and the percentage of all weekday back injuries that occur on Monday for each group. As shown in column 1, medical insurance coverage rates are substantially lower for younger and single workers, and for workers with lower weekly wages. Perhaps surprisingly, however, the fraction of Monday injuries is virtually constant across demographic groups and wage quartiles. These simple tabulations provide little support for the hypothesis that the Monday effect in injury rates is attributable to the post-dating of weekend injuries by uninsured workers.
A potentially stronger test of the link between medical insurance coverage and the Monday effect is obtained by stratifying workers into groups based on their predicted probability of insurance coverage, and then comparing the fraction of Monday injuries across groups. Rows 4a to 4d present medical insurance coverage rates and percentages of Monday injuries for workers grouped into quartiles by the imputed probability of insurance coverage. Again there is no evidence that workers with lower coverage rates have a higher fraction of Monday injuries. Even for back injuries, which tend to be highly concentrated on Mondays, there is n o indication of a larger Monday effect for workers with the lowest probability of medical coverage.
The Distribution of Work Hours over the Week
An important assumption underlying the comparison of injury rates by day of the week is that the distribution of work hours is constant across weekdays. If the probability of working on Mondays varies with the same characteristics as the probability of medical insurance, then the simple comparisons in Table 2 hProbahility of medical covel-age is imputed using data on age, gender, marital status, average weekly wage, industry, and occupation. Individuals are then sorted into quartiles based on their predicted probability of medical coverage.
weekends are excluded, since these indidistribution, however, the fraction at work viduals would never report a weekday inis lowest on Monday and rises over the jury.) We then computed the fraction of week. Further investigation revealed that weekday workers at work on each regular this pattern is attributable to the work schedworkday.
ules of retail trade employees. Low-wage For workers with relatively high probworkers in retail trade have a relatively low abilities of medical coverage (that is, those probability of medical coverage, and are in the upper three quartiles of the prealso more likely to work later in the week dicted medical coverage distribution), the than earlier. Within the retail trade sector, probability of being at work on any given then, the expected fraction of on-the-job weekday is roughly constant. For those in injuries occurring on Monday for workers the lowest quartile of the medical coverage with low medical coverage rates is less than 20%. As a result, a comparison of daily injury rates may fail to show a larger Monof the week they normally work on their main job.
day effect for uninsured workers than for tial probability of Monday work is to exdays. This pattern persists in models that clude retail trade employees from the analyinclude demographic and industry controls sis. As it turns out (see Card and McCall in addition to the predicted coverage vari-1995, Figure 3 ) , this exclusion effectively able. When we exclude retail trade workers equali7-s the probability of working on diffrom the sample, however, the estimated ferent weekdays for the first quartile group. effect of the medical coverage variable is We also conducted a more formal analyconstant across weekdays. Rased on these sis of the relationship between medical infindings, we conclude that the assumption surance coverage rates and the probability of an equal distribution ofwork hours across of working on Monday. Specifically, we fit weekdays is valid, providing that retail trade a series of linear probability models for the employees are excluded from the sample. event of working on different weekdays Figure 2 shows the distribution of week-(arnong the sample of people who usually day back injury claims by quartile of prework at least one weekday), including as an dicted medical coverage for a sample that explanatory variable the estimated probexcludes retail trade workers. For each ability of medical coverage (zilO) formed of the four coverage groups, a higher from the coefficient estimates of equation fraction of back injuries are reported o n ( 2 ) . The results show that workers with a Monday than o n other weekdays. Inhigher probability of medical insurance deed, the distributions of injuries across are more likely to be at work on any weekthe week are quite similar for all four groups. day. Moreover, the effect of the estimated There is no indication that workers with medical coverage variable is larger on Monlow medical coverage rates have a larger "Monday effect" in their back injury rates." Although the May CPS data suggest that workers with different rates of medical coverage have similar relative probabilities of working on Mondays, it should be emphasized that the CPS data pertain to scheduled hours rather than actual work hours. If absentee rates are higher on Mondays, and the differential is correlated with the determinants of medical coverage, then our analysis may understate the effect of medical insurance coverage on Monday injury rates. Statutory holidays are one source of differential absenteeism rates across weekdays. A holiday weekend not only reduces the expected ,lumber of ~o n d ' a y injury claims, but may also lead to an increase in the number of Tuesdayclaims (Smith 1989 ). In the analysis below, we test for the effect of holidays by comparing specifications that exclude major holidays (New Years, Memorial Day, Labor Day, Fourth of July) and treat the day after a holiday as "Monday."
A second possibility is that non-holidayrelated absences are higher on Mondays than other weekdays. We are aware of only one recent study that reports absenteeism rates by day of the week. This study (Barmby, Orme, and Treble 1991) concluded that absenteeism rates on Mondays are about the same as or slightly lower than on Tuesday-Thursday, and actually peak on Fridays." Given this finding, we present some specifications below that exclude Friday injuries. We have been unable to find any studies or data sources that break down absenteeism patterms by day of the week and demographic characteristics. Thus we cannot directly test whether workers with lower medical coverage rates have higher Monday absenteeism. This limitation must be kept in mind in interpreting our results. It is important to keep in mind that the coefficients in these models measure the effect of insurance coverage on the relative fraction of weekday injuries that occur on Monday: they provide no information on the relation between medical insurance coverage and overall injury rates. In fact, tabulations of the March 1987 CPS suggest that workers without medical insurance coverage have slightly lower overall probabilities of a WC injury claim.'" However, our interest here is in the effect of medical insurance on the timing of weekday inju-' W n e could argue that workdays following a holiday are equivalent to a hlonday in terms of the number of off-the-job injuries that have accumulated prior to the start of work (Smith 1989) . Hcnce, in thc specifications in rows 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, and 9, we treat the workday after major holidays (January 1, July 4, hlernorial Day, Labor Day) as a ">Ionday."
Models for the Relative Probability o f a Monday Injury
liIn the cntire CPS samplc of adult workers with earnings in the previous year, 1.76% rcport rccciving WC payments. This fraction is 1.57% for workers withor~t ~ncdical insurance coverage and 1.79% for workers with mcdical coverage. 
I N D U S T R I A L A N D LABOR RELATIONS REVIEW
~~; O / P S :
Standard errors, corrected for heteroskedasticity and two-step estimation method (see text), are in parentheses. Table entries are estimated coefficients of imputed medical coverage fro111 linear probability models for the event of a hlonday injury, estimated on the sample of weekday injul-ies. Models in column 2 include coiitrol variables for gendel-, age, age squared, rnarital status (interacted wit11 gender), industry (8 categories), and occupation (6 categories). Models in column 3 inclrtde 25 additional controls for the nature and carrse of the i~ijrtry. ries, rather than the overall number of such Table 3 . First, different ways of handling injuries.
claims filed 011 holidays or on the day after Most of the estimated coefficients in a holiday have little effect on the estima- Table 3 are positive-the opposite of the tion results (compare the estimates in rows sign predicted by the hypothesis that workb and c with those in row a ) . Similarly, ers without medical insurance are more redefining the pool of weekday injuries to likely than those with medical insurallce to exclude Friday claims has little or n o effect report a Monday injury. Consistellt with on the results. Second, although we exthe fact that retail trade employees with low pected to see a larger effect of illsurance probabilities of medical coverage are less coverage on the weekly pattern of back likely to work on Mondays than are their injuries and strains than on patterns of counterparts in other industries, the excluother injuries, the data d o not confirm this sion of retail trade workers leads to some prediction. The estimation results for the reduction in the estimated coverage coeffis u b s a l n p l e o f i n j u r i e s c l a s s i f i e d as cients. Even when retail trade workers are "strains" are very similar to the results excluded from the sample, however, the based 011 broader samples of injuries, coefficients are positive o r close to zero. a n d t h e results for back illjuries actually Two other conclusions emerge from p o i n t toward slightly positive effects of medical coverage on the probability of a Monday claim. We have estimated a variety of alternative specifications to probe the robustness of these conclusions. In particular, we investigated the effects of adding two additional control variables to our analvsis: the pre-injury wage, and a set of duminy variables representing the worker's benefit-replacement rate while 011 temporary disability. O u r analysis of the replacement rate is motivated by the observation that employees with higher replacement rates who are injured off the job have a stronger incentive to file a fraudulent claim and receive temporary disability payments, rather than work through the recovery period. It is therefore interesting to check whether our inferences about the effect of medical coverage on the magnitude of the Monday effect are robust to the inclusion of ineasures of the replacement rate.
In Minnesota, the M' C benefit rate is fixed at two-thirds of the pre-injury wage, subject to a maximum and minimum linked to the state average weekly w a g e . ' V h e combination of minimum and maxiinuin rates implies that the replacement rate falls into 5 ranges: greater than 1 (for the small percentage of workers who earn less than 20% of the state average weekly wage); exactly 1 (for the 10% of workers whose wage is between 20% and 50% of the state average weekly wage); between 2 / 3 and 1 (for the 20% of workers who earn between 50% and 75% of the state average wage); exactly 2/3 (for roughly 50% of workers who earn between 75% and 150% of the state average wage); and less than 2/3 (for the 20% of workers who earn more than 150% of the state average wage).
O u r findings from these extended specifications are presented in Table 4 . For 
1987) as a lower b o~u r d o n all b e n e f i t s , and a primary m i n i r n r~m such that claimants whose b e n c f i t s would b e below t h e PI-imary m i n i m u m undel. t h e two-thirds formula receive t h e ~O W C I . o f t h c primary minirnlun b e n e f i t amorlnt and thcir weckly wage.
brevity, we report only the results obtained on samples that exclude workers in the retail trade industry. (Results for the overall sample are similar.) In general, neither the level of wages nor the range of the benefit replacement rate exerts an independent effect on the probability of a Monday claim, and the addition of these variables has n o effect on our co~lclusion that the Monday effect in M'C claiins is unrelated to the probability of medical insurance coverage.
Denial of Liability
Just as employees who are injured off the job have an incentive to file fraudulent WC claims, employers and insurers have an incentive to screen out these claims. In Minnesota, employers who intend to dispute the validity of a claim begin the process by filing a "Notice of Denial of Liability" (see Minnesota House of Representatives Research Department 1988). The pattern of denial rates by day of the week and probability of medical coverage provides further evidence on the hypothesis that the Monday effect in injury rates is attributable to the post-dating of weekend illjuries by uninsured workers. If the Monday effect reflects fraudulent claims, we would expect employers to monitor Moilday claims more carefully than claims filed on other days, and to be inore likely to deny liability for Monday injuries.
Minnesota employers filed a notice of denial of liability for about 10% of the injury claims in our sample. Comparisons of denial rates by day orthe week reveal that Monday injury claims were n o more likely to be denied than claims on other days, even for workers with the lowest probabilities of medical coverage."' The same conclusion emerges for the denial rates for '"Across all workers, t h e probability that an accid e n t c l a i~n o n Tlresday-Friday is d e n i e d is 10.3%, versus 10.2% for Rlollday claims. For workers i n t h c lowest quaytile of the ,nedical co\rcraae distrib,Ltion, t h e probability that a T,lesday-Friday claim is denied is 9.876, versus 9.6% for Monday claims. 
tlvo-step erti~rratioli metlrod. are in parcnthescs Standard crrors, corrcctecl for heteroskctlauticit~ a l~t l (see text). Table entrics ar-c estilnatetl corfficielits fro111 lineal-~~r o b a b i l i t ) of a XIontlay modcls for the e~e n t injury, estilnatecl o n the snrnplr of r\.cektla) irljur-y claims, /~xrliccli~~g clnin15 ill ,.(./nil trncl(>. All models inclucle controls for gelidel-, age, age squal-ccl, mal-ital status (iriteractcd wit11 gerider), ilidustr) ( 8 categories), a n d occupation ( 6 categol ies).
.'Replaceme~it late (RR) is the'ratio of the injrrred \rosker's weekly bcnefit ,1niolunt to his 01. lier pre-ir?j~rry wage. The I-eplacrment I-atr is statutoril) cleterminetl n s a frrlictio~i of the pre-ir?ju~-y wagr. All iritiicator for inclividuals with a replacemell t rate equal to tu.o-thil-tls is rxclutled. back injuries, which tend to be more heavily concentrated on Mondays. These patterns do not suggest that employers or insurers are rnore likely to question the legitimacy of Monday claims by groups of employees with low insurance rates (or indeed by ally group of employees).
We have also corlducted a more forinal analysis of the determinalits of the probability of denying liability, based on the follo~ving model:
where x, is a vector of characteristics of the 2"' injury claim, I n , is a n indicator for whether or not the worker who filed the claim has medical i~l s u r a n c e coverage, and Monday, is an indicator for a Monday injury. T h e coefficient d measures tile relative effect of medical coverage on the probability that the employer denies liability for a Monday injury. If uninsured workers are Inore likely than iilsured~vork-ers to file fraudulent Monday claims, then we would expect d to be negative, assuming that fi-audulent claims are Inore likely to be denied. As in our aiialysis of Monday injury rates, we can estimate equation (3) by replacing ?n,with a consistent estimate of the probability of medical coverage (~~' 8 ) . The results of this exercise are reported in Table 5 .
Columns 1-3 of Table 5 present estimation results for the overall-injury sample.
The rnodel in column 1 excludes any additional control variables, while the model in columii2 adds co~itrols for the characteristics of the injury and the worker, as well as dummy variables for i~ijuries reported on holidays, post-holiday workdays, and Fridays. Finally, the model in c o l u m~l 3 adds the injured worker's weekly wage, a n d indic'tors f o r t h e range of t h e worker's benefit-replacement rate (RR) . Parallel sets of rnodels are reported in colurnns 4-6 for the subsalllpleof claims 
IYO~PS:
Estiniated standard errors, corrected for hetetoskedasticity and two-step estimation method (see text), are in parentheses. Models are linear probability models for the event that the employer files a Denial of Liability form, disclaiming responsibility for the injury.
"Satnple excludes all injury claims filed on F r i d a ?~, rnajor holidays, o r the weekday immediately following a major holiday.
"Replacetnent rate (RK): see note to Table 4 . 'Controls for-gendel-, age, marital status, industry, occupation, and nature and cause of the injury. d C o~i t r~lfor injury claims filed on Fridays, major holidays, or the weekday immediately following a major holida?.
that excludes injuries o n holidays, postholiday workdays, a n d Fridays, a n d in colurnns 7-9 for t h e subsample of back ir?juries. With respect to t h e presence of a Monday effect in denial rates, the results in Table 5 a r e clear-cut. T h e r e is n o indication of higher denial rates for Monday injuries, n o r of a differential Monday effect in the denial rate for uninsured workers. Contrary to o u r expectations, employers d o n o t seem to scrutinize Monday illjuries rnore carefully than ir?juries o n o t h e r weekdays.
O n the o t h e r h a n d , t h e results suggest that employers are m o r e likely to deny liability for t h e injuries of u n i n s u r e d workers, a n d particularly workers with higher replacement rates, regardless of the day of their injury. T h e rnodels in columns 2, 5, a n d 8 show a highly significant reduction i n denial rates for insured workers. O n c e controls for t h e wage a n d replacement rate a r e i n t r o d u c e d (columns 3, 6, a n d 9 ) , t h e medical coverage effect falls i n magnitude a n d is n o longer statistically significant. In these specifications, however, the replacement rate variables a r e highly significant, a n d show a consistent pattern of higher denial rates
I N D U S T R I A L , A N D L A B O R R E L A T I O N S R E V I E W f o r w o r k e r s w i t h h i g h e r r e p l a c e m e n t rates." O n e possible e x p l a n a t i o n f o r these findings is t h a t workers w i t h h i g h e r replacem e n t rates are m o r e likely t o file questionable o r f r a u d u l e n t injury claims ( o n any day o f t h e w e e k ) i n h o p e -o f b e g i n n i n g a spkll o f WC benefits. W e would t h e n e x p e c t t o see a h i g h e r probability t h a t e m p l o y e r s contest t h e injury claims o f workers w i t h h i g h e r r e p l a c e m e n t rates.'"ven i f workers with d i f f e r e n t replacernent rates have t h e same probability o f filing a f r a u d u l e n t injury claim, however, e m p l o y e r s m a y b e m o r e likely t o dispute t h e clairns o f workers with h i g h e r r e p l a c e r n e n t r a t e s , s i n c e t h e e m p l o y e r ' s n e t cost o f a n injury spell ( t h e W C b e n e f i t m i n u s t h e savings i n wages) is h i g h e r for t h e s e workers. ~a s e d0 1 1 t h e e v i d e n c e i n T a b l e 5,it is d i f f i c u l t t o distinguish b e t w e e n t h e s e alternative explanations. In sumniary, t h e patterns o f denial o f liability f o r W C injury clairns show virtually n o evidence o f a M o n d a y e f f e c t , n o r o f a larger M o n d a y e f f e c t for workers w h o lack medical coverage for their o f f -t h e -j o b injuries. I f a h i g h e r fraction o f M o n d a y injury claims t h a n o f claims o n o t h e r davs are truly f r a u d u l e n t , it is hard t o e x~l a i n w h y e mployers d o n o t scrutinize these claims rnore carefully and d e n y liability f o r a h i g h e r fraction o f M o n d a y injuries. T h u s , t h e absence o f a M o n d a y e f f e c t i n denial rates is consistent with o u r findings o n t h e relative rate o f M o n d a v iniuries f o r workers , J with h i g h e r and lower probabilities o f m e d ical insurance. I n n e i t h e r case d o t h e results
"LVe also estimated specificatio~is that i~i c l~~d e c l intrl-actions of t h r Monday illclicator with inclicatol-s fol-the cliffel-rnt ranges of the ~e p l a c r m r n t rat?. These rnodels show n o indication of a differential Moriday effect in d r n i a l I-atrs for-workers with differe n t I-eplacenient I-ates. '"Cheli~~s (1982) analyzed the effect of replacrm e n t rates oli the frequelicy of LVC ir~jur: claims, ancl arguecl that a higher rate of i~i j u~i e s fol-workers with highrl-replacement rates may reflect either lower safrt! incentives for these workrl-s, o r a higher I-atr of fi-attdulent clainis a m o n g workers with h i g h r r repl:~cemelit r,~tes.
support t h e view t h a t t h e h i g h e r overall rate o f M o n d a y injuries is driven b y a h i g h e r rate o f f r a u d u l e n t claims by workers w h o lack rnedical insurance.
Summary and Conclusions
T h i s paper is lnotivated by a simple observation: certain types o f injuries are m o r e likely t o arise o n M o n d a y s~t h a n o n o t h e r weekdays. T h i s " M o n d a y e f f e c t " has b e e n i n t e r p r e t e d as e v i d e n c e t h a t sorne employees ~' h o are injured off-the-job d u r i n i t h e w e e k e n d r e p o r t their injuries as having occurred at w o r k ( S m i t h 1 9 8 9 ) . W o r k e r s w i t h o u t medical insurance have a particularly strong incenti\re t o "post-date" weeke n d injuries a n d file a n injury clairn o n M o n d a y . T o evaluate t h e e f f e c t o f this i n c e n t i v e , w e use a two-sample estimation strategy t o c o m b i n e injury data b y day o f t h e w e e k fro111 t h e M i n n r s o t a M'orkers' C o m p e n s a t i o n system with medical insurance coverage data f r o m t h e March C u rr e n t Population Survey. Contrary t o o u r expectations, w e find t h a t e m p l o y e e s with low rates o f medical insurance coverage were n o m o r e likely t h a n o t h e r workers t o file a M o n d a y inj~jury claim. O n e explanation f o r this f i n d i n g is t h a t ernployees with low probabilities o f m e d ical insurance coverage are less likely t h a n o t h e r workers t o w o r k o n Mondays. Ind e e d , low-wage workers i n retail trade have below-average medical coverage rates a n d are less likely t h a n o t h e r workers t o work earlier i n t h e w e e k . W h e n we e x c l u d e retail trade ernployees frorn o u r analysis, however, w e c o n t i n u e t o find t h a t medical insurance coverage rates are unrelated t o t h e relative fraction o f M o n d a y injuries. W e also c h e c k f o r t h e e f f e c t o f holiday weeke n d s by e x c l u d i n g injuries filed o n major h o l i d a y s a n d p o s t -h o l i d a y w o r k d a y s . A g a i n , w e f i n d n o i n d i c a t i o n t h a t w o r k e r s w h o l a c k e d nledical i n s u r a n c e filed m o r e M o n d a y injury claims t h a n d i d o t h e r w o r ke r s . J u s t as enlployees have a n incentive t o r e p o r t o f f -t h e -j o b injuries as having occurred at w o r k , e m~l o v e r s a n d insurers have
A , a n incentive t o screen o u t fraudulent claims.
In fact, employers denied liability for about 10% of the injury claims in our sample. If a higher fraction of Monday injuries are fraudulent, we would expect to see higher denial rates for these injuries, especially for claimants with the lowest probabilities of off-the-job medical insurance. Consistent with our conclusions based on the Monday effect in injury rates, however, we find that employers were n o more likely to deny liability for Monday injury claims than for claims made on other days-even for workers with low probabilities of medical coverage. These findings suggest two tentative conclusions. First, the interpretation of the "Monday effect" in injury rates as evidence of frauduleilt claim behavior may be inappropriate. A higher fraction of back sprains, strains, and similar irljuries occurs on Monday than other weekdays. However, these injuries are evenly distributed across the work force, and are not associated with a higher probability that the employer will dispute liability for the injury. An alternative explanation for the "Monday effect" is that a higher fraction of strains, sprains, and back injuries truly arise on Mondays, perhaps as a consequence of the return to work after a weekend hiatus. Recent research suggests that a similar Monday effect arises in the weekly pattern of heart attacks among the working populationan effect that is surely unrelated to fraud (Willich et al. 1994) . M' e believe that the evidence in this paper is more consistent with a physiologically based explanation for the Monday effect than with an explanation based on fraudulent claim filing.
Second, concern that the Workers' Cornpensation system is covering the costs of off-the-job irljuries for workers without medical insurance has led to growing inter-' est in "24 hour" coverage plans and other alternatives to the current WC system. Our findings suggest that more evidence is needed to firmly establish the rate offraudulent claim activity and to evaluate the benefits of any reform in the WC insurance system.
